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Law Firms on the Big Board?:
A Proposal for Nonlawyer
Investment in Law Firms
Edward S. Adamst
John H. Mathesontt
Every state has a rule proscribing nonlawyer investment in law firms.
This sixty-plus-year-old prohibition has created an inefficient legal
services market. Firms cannot access capital markets, limiting their op-
portunities for expansion, curtailing investments in technology and
training, and hindering competition. Furthermore, every jurisdiction
except the District of Columbia prohibits lawyers from entering into a
business association with nonlawyers as partners or directors if the
business provides legal services. These prohibitions against nonlawyer
investment and participation in law firms have long hindered the legal
profession with no signs of change. This Article advocates that these
prohibitions be lifted. It discusses the source of these prohibitions and
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the historical and ethical arguments of critics, which are shown to be
merely phantom concerns. These concerns are far outweighed by the
substantial benefits of allowing law firms to incorporate, to engage in
business associations with nonlawyers, and to receive investments by
nonlawyers. The benefits include capital for expansion, capital for in-
vestment in new technologies and new lawyers, financing for contin-
gency fee cases, and a myriad of other rewards. Most persuasively,
perhaps, as the practice of law continues to be increasingly transformed
from a profession into a business, it makes little sense to prevent lawyers
from using the financial tools that virtually every other business has
available to it.
Every year the partners of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
unquestionably one of the nation's preeminent law firms, hold a retreat
to rejoice in their continued success and to celebrate the firm's big
plans for the future.' Skadden's 1991 retreat was quite different, how-
ever. Presentations regarding the firm's changing economic condition
dominated the retreat's meetings, with a primary focus centered on the
law firm's international practice.2
From 1970 to 1986, the net surplus for services in the American
balance of trade climbed from $2.3 billion to $18.9 billion. Yet
"Skadden had barely a sliver of this growing business."3 The reasons
given at the retreat were the firm's lack of overseas offices and its fail-
ure to market aggressively overseas.4 Realizing that Skadden lagged sig-
nificantly behind other United States law firms in competition for
overseas clients and international business, some felt the firm must ex-
pand into the global market in order to succeed in providing "multi-
national services to multi-national clients. '5 Many of the nation's cor-
porate giants had significant overseas operations, and to attract this
business Skadden would need to expand.6
Although existing overseas offices had already cost the Skadden
partners between seven and ten million dollars, the partners felt that the
overseas offices had produced increased revenues in domestic offices
that far exceeded that amount.7 With this experience in mind, the most
likely approach in the firm's expansion strategy "would be the
1. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN 278 (1993).
2. See id. at 278.
3. Id. at 283.
4. See id at 283-84.
5. Id. at 284.
6. See id. at 295.
7. See id.
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establishment of Skadden offices in the world's 'major international
financial centers."'"
Just as any other enterprise, Skadden would need large amounts of
capital to place its plan into effect. Unlike almost any other enterprise,
however, the option of turning to the equity markets for the necessary
capital did not exist. Today, as for any other law firm, this option would
still not exist.
Every state has a rule proscribing nonlawyer investment in law
firms. This bar has created an inefficient system for providing profes-
sional legal services, as firms cannot access the capital markets, giving
them only limited opportunities for expansion, competition, and pur-
chases of equipment and personnel. Additionally, every jurisdiction ex-
cept the District of Columbia prohibits lawyers from entering into a
business association with nonlawyers as partners or directors if the busi-
ness provides legal services. These prohibitions against nonlawyer in-
vestment and participation in law firms have hindered the legal
profession for over sixty years with no signs of change.
This Article advocates necessary changes to these inefficient prohi-
bitions. Part I discusses the long-standing prohibition against nonlawyer
investment in law firms and the forms it has taken in the rules and codes
that have governed lawyers for over sixty years. Part II discusses the
historical and ethical arguments comprising the "Fear of Sears"9 and
the problems critics believe to be inherent in allowing nonlawyers to
control law firms. Part ImI examines the business organizations and asso-
ciations currently available to lawyers, outlining their benefits and draw-
backs. Part IV examines the potential benefits of allowing law firms to
incorporate, to engage in business associations with nonlawyers, and to
receive investments from nonlawyers. Finally, Part V discusses the
agency and risk-sharing problems that might plague such a model as
well as potential solutions to these problems.
I
TRADITIONAL PROHIBITIONS ON NONLAWYER
PARTICIPATION IN LAW FIRMS
The traditional view that nonlawyers should be prohibited from
investing in law firms first took root in the ABA's Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1928. Over the years, the rule has been
interpreted strictly to forbid lawyers from being governed by
8. Id. at 284.
9. The "Fear of Sears" is a long-used expression representing the fears of those opposed to
nonlawyer ownership and management of law firms. The expression stems from the fear that Sears,
Roebuck & Co., for example, could own its own law firm-an unthinkable concept to those opposed
to nonlawyer investment in law firms.
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nonlawyers or from engaging in a broad range of business associations
with nonlawyers. The prohibition was included in the first Model Code
of Professional Responsibility in 1969. After significant debate, the
doctrine was also incorporated into the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983. Almost every jurisdiction has adopted either the
Model Rules or the Model Code and, with them, the prohibition on
nonlawyer investment in law firms. For nearly seventy years, the
profession's Fear of Sears has doomed any proposal that would have
allowed a nonlawyer even a passive investment in a law firm.
A. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
In 1908, the ABA promulgated the original Canons of Professional
Ethics ("the Canons"). 0 The Canons represented the ABA's formal
position on matters of legal ethics. As originally promulgated, the
Canons did not address whether practicing lawyers could enter into
business associations with nonlawyers. Twenty years later, however, the
ABA adopted additional rules that essentially prohibited practicing law-
yers from entering into partnerships or business associations with non-
lawyers."l
Specifically, in 1928 the ABA adopted Canons 33, 34, and 35.12
Canon 33, which addressed partnerships generally, provided that:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no per-
son should be admitted who is not a member of the legal profes-
sion, duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional
discipline .... Partnerships between lawyers and members of
other professions or non-professional persons should not be
formed or permitted where a part of the partnership's business
consists of the practice of law. 3
Canons 34 and 35 buttressed Canon 33. Canon 34 stated that "[n]o di-
vision of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility."'" Canon 35 added
that "[tihe professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer ... [A lawyer] should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties in the interest of such inter-
mediary."'5 Together, these three canons effectively barred practicing
10. See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS 423 (1996).
11. See Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 53 AB.A. 119-31 (1928).
12. See id. at 130-31, 769.
13. Id. at 778.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 779.
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lawyers from entering into business associations with nonlawyers, either
directly or indirectly.'6
The ABA did not promulgate these new canons without objections
from the bar, however. In fact, the drafting committee acknowledged
that "there is substantial difference of view in the profession respecting
its recommendations as to partnerships, division of fees, intermediaries,
and the bonding of lawyers .... ,1" At least one member of the drafting
committee issued a report expressing the opinion that "aside from pro-
fessional policy, there is nothing inherently 'unethical' in the formation
of partnerships between lawyers engaged in certain kinds of work and
an expert engineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert."'"
For over forty years, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances interpreted the restrictions of Canons 33, 34, and 35
broadly by consistently ruling that any business association between
lawyers and nonlawyers that offered legal services was prohibited. 9 In
an opinion addressing a lawyer's employment by an accounting firm,
for example, the ABA committee stated:
When a lawyer-employee advises his lay employer in regard
to a matter pertaining to the affairs of a client of the employer
and the giving of such advice by the lawyer-employee directly to
the client would involve him in the practice of law, the lawyer is
16. Together, Canons 33, 34, and 35 have prohibited attorneys from acting as employees or
partners of patent application prosecutors, accountants, banks, collection agencies, insurance
companies, lending agencies, and many other private associations. See ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal and Informal Ops. 139-64 (1967).
17. Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 52 A.B.A. 378 (1927).
18. Id. at 388 (minority view of F.W. Grinnell).
19. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 269 (1945) (requiring
that an attorney entering into a partnership with a certified public accountant to specialize in income
tax work and related accounting matters cease to hold himself out as an attorney-at-law and strictly
confine activities to those open only to a lay accountant); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 257 (1944) (allowing an attorney to enter into a partnership with a layperson
who is an agent licensed by the U.S. patent office if the partnership's activities are limited to such as
permitted to laypersons under patent office rules); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 239 (1942) (disallowing a practicing attorney from forming a partnership
with a certified public accountant to act as consultants in tax matters and represent taxpayers before
the Internal Revenue Service Board of Tax Appeals); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 201 (1940) (preventing a partnership between an attorney and layperson
where the services rendered, if rendered by an attorney, would constitute the practice of law even
though laypersons were allowed to render the same services under law); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 32 (1931) (preventing attorney from associating with
a layperson who is admitted to prosecute patent applications to the U.S. Patent Office when the
layperson does business under the name of a firm holding itself out as "attorneys" or "solicitors in
patent causes"); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 31 (1931)
(prohibiting lawyer from accepting employment at a corporation in the business of preparing
incorporation documents).
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proceeding in violation of Canon 35 when he operates through
his employer as an intermediary."
The committee also thwarted attempts by lawyers to avoid the rules
by entering into non-partnership business associations with nonlawyers.
Thus, although the committee had allowed lawyers to form professional
law corporations under certain conditions; one such condition prevented
nonlawyers from owning any interest in the corporation or acting as a
director or officer of the corporation.2 After noting that "Canon
33... promulgates underlying principles that must be observed no
matter in what form of organization lawyers practice law," the commit-
tee asserted:
Canon 33 prohibits the formation of a partnership for the
practice of a partnership between lawyers and non-lawyers. This
prohibition would likewise apply to the practice of law in any
other form. Permanent beneficial and voting rights in the or-
ganization set up to practice law, whatever its form, must be re-
stricted to lawyers while the organization is engaged in the
practice of law.'
The Committee's opinion made it clear that it would look to substance
over form in enforcing Canons 33, 34, and 35. The ABA incorporated
this approach into its next version of ethical rules, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.
B. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (the "Model Code")." By 1980, almost
every state had adopted a code of professional responsibility based on
the Model Code. Although the Model Code differed from the Canons
in both form and content, the principles of Canons 33, 34, and 35 car-
ried over into the Model Code. Canon 33 was reborn as Disciplinary
Rule ("DR") 3-103(A), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not form
a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership
20. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961).
21. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961) [hereinafter Opinion 303].
Opinion 303 allowed attorneys to practice in the corporate form provided that:
(1) the lawyer rendering the legal services to the client must be personally responsible to
the client; (2) restrictions on liability as to other lawyers in the organization must be made
apparent to the client; (3) none of the stockholders may be non-lawyers, of if stock falls into
the hands of laymen, provision must be made for transfer back to lawyers; (4) there must be
no profit-sharing plans including employees who are non-lawyers; and (5) no layman may
be permitted to participate in the management of the firm.
Id.
22. Id.
23. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 10, at 423.
24. See id.
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consist of the practice of law."" Canon 34, which had prohibited fee-
splitting with nonlawyers, found continued life in DR 3-102(A), which
states: "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-
lawyer.... "26 Canon 35's principles can be found in several provisions
of the Code. First, DR 5-107(C) prohibits lawyers from practicing in a
professional corporation or association if "[a] non-lawyer has the right
to direct or control the professional judgment of [the] lawyer."'27 Sec-
ond, DR 5-107(B) directs that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another
to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal
services. '28 Finally, Ethical Consideration ("EC") 3-3 emphasizes that
the Disciplinary Rules "protect the public" by prohibiting a lawyer
"from submitting to the control of others in the exercise of his judg-
ment."29
The Model Code also expressly incorporated the restrictions out-
lined in ABA Opinion 303 relating to lawyers practicing in professional
corporations. Thus, DR 5-107(C) prohibits a lawyer from practicing in
a professional corporation if a nonlawyer either "owns any interest
therein"3 or "is a corporate director or officer thereof."32 In short, the
Model Code continued the tradition of the Canons and the ABA
Opinions, prohibiting practicing lawyers from entering into business
associations with nonlawyers.
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103(A) (1980).
26. Id. DR 3-102(A). This rule, however, has three exceptions: first, a lawyer can arrange for
the payment of money to his estate after his death; second, a lawyer who undertakes to complete
unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay a proportion of the fees relating to the deceased
lawyer's services to the estate of the deceased lawyer; and third, nonlawyer employees may be
included in a compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is based on profit-sharing. See id
DR 3-102(A)(l)-(3).
Ethical Consideration 3-8 implies a rationale for the restrictions on practicing with nonlawyers
and sharing legal fees with laymen. It states that "[s]ince a lawyer should not aid or encourage a
layman to practice law, he should not practice law in association with a layman or otherwise share
legal fees with a layman." Id. EC 3-8. The EC explains the rationale for exceptions to the fee-sharing
prohibition by stating that "[tihese limited exceptions.., are permissible since they do not aid or
encourage laymen to practice law." Id. The implication is that these rules are designed to keep the
profession clear of any taint of the lay practice of law. The purposes of these restrictions are further
discussed infra Part II.D and accompanying notes.
27. Id. DR 5-107(C)(3).
28. Id. DR 5-107(B).
29. Id. EC 3-3.
30. See Opinion 303, supra note 21 (referring, in part, to Opinion 303's restrictions on
lawyer/nonlawyer associations).
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C)(1) (1980). The rule,
however, provides a limited exception: "[A] fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may
hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration." Id.
32. Id. DR 5-107(C)(2).
1998]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
C. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In 1977, only eight years after adopting the Model Code, the ABA
created the Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards to
consider and recommend revisions.3 This commission became known
as the Kutak Commission, named after its chair, Robert Kutak.' Between
1979 and 1982, the Kutak Commission circulated four major drafts of
its proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,35 and on August 2,
1983, the ABA House of Delegates formally adopted the Model Rules. 6
As of August 1997, at least thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had adopted the Model Rules either in their entirety or in sig-
nificant part.37
During the Model Rules' drafting, the Kutak Commission consid-
ered and rejected the traditional view that practicing lawyers should be
prohibited from entering into business associations with nonlawyers. As
a result, the Commission's 1981 draft recommended that the ABA
adopt Proposed Rule 5.4, providing that:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a
financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by
a non-lawyer... such as a business corporation, insurance com-
pany, legal services organization or government agency, but
only if the terms of the relationship provide in writing that:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to the representation of a client is
protected as required by [the rule on confidentiality of informa-
tion];
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or personal
contact with prospective clients prohibited by [the advertising
and soliciting rules]; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that
violates [the rule on fees].38
Proposed Rule 5.4 represented a dramatic departure from the tra-
ditional stance of the Canons and the Model Code.39 As written,
33. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 10, at 3.
34. See id. at xvii.
35. See id. at 3.
36. See id.
37. See ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUC 01:3 (Aug. 20, 1997).
38. Id. at 292-93.
39. The Comment and Notes accompanying the Proposed Rule 5.4 rationalized this departure
from traditional prohibitions on forming partnerships or sharing fees with nonlawyers by noting the
changes in the practice of law over time. The Commission noted that law firms no longer consist
solely of lawyers. Law firms rely increasingly on paralegals and professionals from other fields to
manage various aspects of the firm. Additionally, many lawyers work for organizations other than
law firms, such as government agencies, private corporations, and public defender and group legal
service organizations. Nonlawyers often direct the work of attorneys in these organizations. See
[Vol. 86:1
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Proposed Rule 5.4 would have allowed corporate investment and, thus,
nonlawyer control of law firms. Indeed, it would have opened the door
for law firms to "go public." In light of traditional opposition to this
notion, it is no surprise that this proposed rule was the only rule from
the 1982 final draft that was rejected in its entirety and rewritten by the
House of Delegates.'
The Kutak Commission justified its rejection of the traditional ap-
proach in both the Comment and the Legal Background sections that
accompanied its Proposed Rule 5.4."4 The Legal Background section, in
particular, was highly critical of the traditional approach:
To prohibit all intermediary arrangements is to assume that
the lawyer's professional judgment is impeded by the fact of
being employed by a lay organization.... The assumed
equivalence between employment and interference with the law-
yer's professional judgment is at best tenuous.... Applications
of unauthorized practice principles, only tenuously related to
substantial ethical concerns raised by intermediary relationships,
may be viewed as economic protectionism for traditional legal
service organizations ....
The exceptions to per se prohibitions on legal service ar-
rangements involving nonlawyers have substantially eroded the
general rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various meth-
ods of organization on the basis of form or sponsorship. Adher-
ence to the traditional prohibitions has impeded development of
new methods of providing legal services.42
Similarly, the Comment to Proposed Rule 5.4 noted that "'[g]iven the
complex variety of modern legal services' . . which 'raise problems
concerning the client-lawyer relationship.., it is impractical to define
organizational forms that uniquely can guarantee compliance with the
Rule of Professional Conduct."'43
Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 386 (1988). In fact, the ABA specifically discussed the role of
nonlawyers in supervising the board of directors of a legal services association in Formal Opinion
324. See infra note 97.
40. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 10, at 293.
41. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?. 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 594 (1989).
42. Id. at 594-95.
43. Id. at 594 (quoting Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 107 A.B.A. 886-87
(1982) (Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards)). The Kutak Commission
included a listing of the different legal services organizations:
[Miultimember partnerships, firms employing paraprofessionals and professionals of other
disciplines, professional corporations, insurance companies that employ counsel who
represent insureds, law departments of organizations, and group legal service organizations
in which non-lawyers, or lawyers acting in a managerial capacity, may be directors or have
managerial responsibility.
Id. (quoting Annual Report of the American Bar Association, 107 A.B.A. 886-87 (1982)).
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Apparently, the ABA House of Delegates saw things differently. In
February 1983, Proposed Rule 5.4 became the subject of debate at a
House of Delegates meeting." The proponents of the Rule met strong
opposition from the General Practice Section, which had submitted an
amendment to the Rule which would essentially continue the traditional
prohibitions against sharing fees and forming business associations with
nonlawyers."
Those opposing the Kutak Commission's version of the rule as-
serted several grounds for their opposition. 7 First, opponents contended
that the Commission's proposal would permit Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
H & R Block, or Big Eight accounting firms to open law offices which
would compete with traditional law firms." Second, nonlawyer owner-
ship of law firms would interfere with the professional independence of
lawyers.49 Third, nonlawyer ownership would result in economic pres-
sures that would undermine the "professionalism" of law. 0 Finally, the
Rule could dramatically alter, in unforeseeable ways, the structure of the
legal profession."' According to Professor Hazard, the debate wound
44. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 391.
45. See id.
46. See id at 391-92.
47. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 595.
48. See idt During the debate, a member opposing the Kutak Commission's proposed rule
admonished:
You each have a constituency. How will you explain to the sole practitioner who finds
himself in competition with Sears why you voted for this? How will you explain to the man
in the mid-size firm who is being put out of business by the big eight law [sic] firms? How
will you explain that?
I at 595 n.107 (quoting Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 48 (Feb. 8, 1983)
(alteration in original) [hereinafter HOD Transcript]).
49. See id. at 595. Another opponent had stated:
I cannot conceive that a lawyer can maintain his independence and his independent
judgment over a period of time when he's on a salary from a corporation that's looking
over his shoulder at his results in terms of profit. Now if you wish to destroy our profession
as we've known it... if you want to destroy it, the young lawyer's opportunities in this
country to enjoy the same professional independence that you and I have known,
then ... support the Commission.
Id. at 595 n.108 (quoting HOD Transcript, supra note 48, at 46-47).
50. See id at 595. Another opponent inquired:
Is it cost-effect[ive] to provide full representation? Is it cost-effective to zealously
represent your client? Is it cost-effective to spend enough time with your client to get the
job properly done? I think the answer is no. But clearly as lawyers, as professionals, we
must get the job done properly, and we must spend that time and we must do those things.
But what about the business venturer who owns this firm, he who hires or fires the lawyers?
They needn't view it that way. Now if the safeguards of the Commission were
adequate... fine. But [they] won't be, and I submit who is in trouble if there is a violation
of these rules? Is it the venturer or the lawyer? It's the lawyer; the venturer isn't even
under the jurisdiction.
Id. at 595 n.109 (quoting HOD Transcript, supra note 48, at 41-42) (alterations in original).
51. See id. at 595. Another opponent stated:
No one can tell you what the impact of Rule 5.4 is going to be on the legal profession, but
everyone can assure you, and you can assure yourself merely by reading it, that it is going
to have a major impact and mark a fundamental change in the practice of law.
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down quickly after he responded "yes" to the question: "Does this
rule mean that Sears, Roebuck will be able to open a law office?"52 In
the end, the General Practice Section's traditional view prevailed, and
the Kutak Commission's Proposed Rule 5.4 was rejected.53
D. Local Variations on the ABA Ethics Rules
The ABA's Model Rules and Model Code are not binding upon
the legal profession or lawyers. Rather, each state is free to adopt and
enforce its own rules of ethics. Accordingly, each state court system
generally assumes responsibility for promulgating ethics rules and en-
forcing them against members of the state bar. In some states, however,
the state legislature may issue the rules and allow the state courts to en-
force them. Under either scheme, states typically rely heavily on the
ABA's models when drafting their own ethics rules. However, two juris-
dictions, the District of Columbia and North Dakota, have considered
adopting the Kutak Commission's version of Model Rule 5.4.
1. District of Columbia
Perceiving a need for "one-stop shopping" for professional serv-
ices, the District of Columbia's Jordan Committee, the group responsi-
ble for reviewing the Model Rules and proposing an ethical code to the
D.C. Board of Governors, decided to reject the ABA's Model Rule 5.4
and its traditional prohibitions.- Instead, the Jordan Committee recom-
mended that a version similar to that of the Kutak Commission be
adopted to allow lawyers to offer ancillary services. 55 The Jordan
Committee's Proposed Rule 5.4 provided in part:
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other
form of organization in which a financial interest is held or
managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, but only if:
(1) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(2) The confidences and secrets of the lawyer's clients are
protected as required by [the confidentiality rules];
(3) The arrangement does not involve advertising or per-
sonal contact with prospective clients prohibited by [the adver-
tising and solicitation rules];
(4) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that
violates [the rule governing fees]; and
Id. at 595 n.1 10 (quoting HOD Transcript, supra note 48, at 37-38).
52. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 392 (quoting Interview with Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. (March 7, 1988)).
53. See id
54. See id. at 393.
55. See id. at 394.
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(5) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.56
The Jordan Committee's proposed rule would have achieved its
intended purpose of allowing nonlawyers and practicing lawyers to en-
ter into partnerships or other business associations. However, the
proposed rule also appeared to allow nonlawyers to invest passively in
law firms, at least according to Business Week and the National Law
Journal. Articles appeared in each of these publications within a week
of each other, setting off the Fear of Sears syndrome that ultimately
doomed the Jordan Commission's proposed rule." According to the
Business Week article, adoption of the Jordan Commission's rule
"eventually could allow law firms to go public. And it could pave the
way for such retailers as Sears, Roebuck & Co. to add legal counseling
to their array of services."58 Although the Jordan Committee had not
intended this result, it had to respond to the Fear of Sears.
In September, 1987, the Jordan Committee submitted a supple-
mentary petition to the court considering the proposed rules. This sup-
plementary document stated:
There was no thought that proposed Rule 5.4 should permit
any organization or entity to effectively acquire and control a
law firm. Acquisitions of organizations such as economic con-
suiting firms by other entities or organizations have, in fact,
taken place in recent years, but the Board of Governors does not
consider such acquisitions appropriate with respect to law firms
or other comparable legal organizations. 9
To make this clear, the Commission proposed changing Proposed
Rule 5.4 to read: "A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other
form of organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial
authority exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal
services to clients .... ."I In addition, the Commission suggested that
the Comment to Rule 5.4 make clear that the rule would not allow Sears,
Roebuck & Co. to enter the law business.6 The court ultimately adopted
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Paula Dwyer, Soon Anybody May Be Able to Own a Law Firm, Bus. WK., Jan. 26,
1987, at 42; David A. Kaplan, Ethics Change in Works: Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, NAT'L LJ.,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 1.
58. Dwyer, supra note 57, at 42.
59. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 399 (quoting Supplementary Petition of the Board of
Governors of the D.C. Bar Regarding Adoption of Rules of Professional Conduct and Related
Comments at 4-5 (Sept. 11, 1987)).
60. Id. (quoting Supplementary Petition of the Board of Governors of the D.C. Bar Regarding
Adoption of Rules of Professional Conduct and Related Comments at 4-5 (Sept. 11, 1987) (emphasis
omitted)).
61. See id. A proposed Comment to Rule 5.4 stated:
[The proposed rule] does not permit an individual or entity to acquire all of any part of the
practice organization for investment or other purposes. It thus does not permit a
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the Commission's revised proposal verbatim, allaying any Fear of
Sears.62 The District of Columbia, however, was not the only jurisdiction
which considered rejecting the ABA's Model Rule 5.4. North Dakota
also considered an alternative.
2. North Dakota
In January 1986, the Professional Conduct Study Subcommittee of
the North Dakota's Attorney Standards Committee approved a pro-
posed rule to allow practicing lawyers to associate with nonlawyers.6 3
The rule, similar to that proposed by the Kutak Commission, read:
Except as prohibited or restricted by law,6 a lawyer may
provide legal services to a client in association with a nonlawyer
if:
(a) The association does not permit any interference with
the lawyer's independent professional judgment or with the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is pro-
tected as required by these rules;
(c) The association does not result in communication about
the lawyer, a person professionally associated with the lawyer or
their services which violates these rules; and
(d) The association does not result in the client being
charged a fee that violates these rules.65
The state bar's Board of Governors and the Attorney Standards
Committee subsequently approved this proposed rule.'
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, was not immune to the
Fear of Sears syndrome. The court was in the process of considering the
proposed rule when the Business Week and National Law Journal arti-
cles arrived at the newsstands.67 According to Larry Spears, an assistant
state court administrator, the articles "threw a chill in the air."68 The
corporation, an investment banking firm, an investor, or any other person or entity to entitle
itself to all or any portion of the income or profits of a law firm or other similar
organization. Since such an investor would not be an individual performing professional
services with the law firm or other organization, the requirements of [the rule] would not be
met.
Id. at 400.
62. See GiLLERs & SIMON, supra note 10, at 293-94.
63. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 399-400.
64. Significantly, North Dakota's professional corporation statute prohibited the formation of
cross-disciplinary professional associations. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-04 (1997). Thus, although the
proposed ethical rule would have allowed practicing lawyers to associate with nonlawyers, North
Dakota's corporate law would bar such a practice.
65. See GILLERs & SIMON, supra note 10, at 296.
66. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 402.
67. See i
68. Id. (quoting Interview with Larry Spears, assistant state court administrator for the North
Dakota Supreme Court, by Larry Lempert (Feb. 1, 1988)).
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court also received letters that, according to Spears, predicted that "the
world would come to an end if Sears came in. "69 Several months later,
after hearing from both opponents and proponents of Proposed Rule
5.4, the court rejected it without explanation and adopted Model Rule
5.4.70 Thus far, there has been no effort to reconsider the court's deci-
sion.
Over the decades, much debate has surrounded prohibitions on
nonlawyer ownership or partnership in law firms. In the end, however,
the traditional view has always prevailed. In the course of these discus-
sions, critics have expressed many reasons why these traditional prohi-
bitions are necessary to protect the standards of the legal profession.
What these critics fail to recognize, however, is that other current ethical
standards already offer adequate protection.
II
DEBUNKING CONVENTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BAN ON LEGAL
CORPORATIONS
One commentator has characterized the traditional restrictions on
nonlawyer investment or participation in law firms as "stubbornly re-
sistant to change."'7' Those resisting change typically resort to the few
well-rehearsed and surprisingly well-received justifications noted below.
A. Fear of Corporate Giants
One of the driving forces behind the opposition to nonlawyer in-
vestment in law firms is the fear of large corporations overwhelming the
legal marketplace, putting many small firms and sole practitioners out
of business."2 Yet the conflict of interest rules place inherent limits on
law firm size.'3 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7
prohibits representing directly adverse clients or clients whose repre-
sentation may be materially limited by responsibilities to other clients or
by the lawyer's own interests.74 This prohibition applies unless the law-
yer reasonably believes there will be no adverse effect and the lawyer
obtains the client's informed consent. 5 Model Rule 1.9 prohibits repre-
senting a person with interests adverse to a non-consenting former client
in the same or a substantially related matter.76 The prohibition extends
69. Id. (quoting Interview with Larry Spears, assistant state court administrator for the North
Dakota Supreme Court, by Larry Lempert (Feb. 1, 1988)).
70. See iL
71. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 599-600.
72. See supra note 48.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (1996).
74. See id. Rule 1.7.
75. See id Rule 1.7(a).
76. See id. Rule 1.9.
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to clients of the lawyer's former firm if the lawyer has knowledge of
material privileged information relating to the former client.?' Model
Rule 1.10 imputes the disqualification of one lawyer to the entire firm.78
Model Rule 1.11 restricts former government lawyers from representing
clients in matters in which the lawyer participated personally and sub-
stantially while a public officer or employee 9 It also prohibits her firm
from such representation unless the lawyer is screened from the entire
matter.80
A notable case, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., '
disqualified Kirkland & Ellis82 upon discovery of a conflict between cli-
ents represented by the Chicago office and the Washington, D.C. office.
Westinghouse, through Kirkland's Chicago office, had sued certain oil
companies who were members of an industry group, American
Petroleum Institute, represented by Kirkland's D.C. office. 3 The court
made a point of noting that "there is no basis for creating separate dis-
qualification rules for large firms even though the burden of complying
with ethical considerations will naturally fall more heavily upon their
shoulders.""
Commentators have noted that these conflict of interest rules have
the practical effect of limiting law firm size. 5 As a law firm increases in
size and opens branches in multiple cities, both the potential for con-
flicts of interest and the difficulty in resolving them increases.86 To a
large degree, then, the fear that a few large companies would dominate
the legal landscape seems unwarranted. Firms, it would seem, limit their
own size once they have grown large enough to actually face fewer
business opportunities with continued expansion, although anecdotally
it does not seem that any of them have reached that point yet.
B. Interference With Professional Independence and Judgment
Those resisting change argue that shareholders' pressure on attor-
neys to maximize shareholder value by increasing profits will inevitably
result in interference with lawyers' ability to exercise independent
77. See id Rule 1.9(c).
78. See id Rule 1.10.
79. See id. Rule 1.11.
80. See id. Rule 1.11(a).
81. 580 F.2d 1311 (7thCir. 1978).
82. See id. at 1322.
83. See id. at 1313.
84. Id at 1321.
85. See GEoFmY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL.., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 640 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that "[t]he rule of decisions such as Westinghouse effectively limits the size of firms.").
86. See Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV.
L.REv. 1244, 1285 (1981).
1998]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
judgment."a These arguments frequently rest on the fear that nonlawyers
in management will exert control over a lawyer's actions, forcing deci-
sions that are best for the organization's business, rather than decisions
that the lawyer knows are best for the client." While debating the possi-
bility of modifying the ethical canons' proscription of nonlawyer-
controlled law firms, one delegate illustrated this fear by protesting that
the "proposed abolition of the prohibitions would be a 'breach of the
golden rule. The one who has the gold makes the rules, and the one that
has the gold... is going to be a nonlawyer."'' 9 Those making this
claim, however, cannot point to empirical evidence suggesting that this
would inevitably be the result.
In reality, nonlawyer-controlled law firms, which could take the
form of private entities with nonlawyer ownership or publicly traded
corporations, would be in the business of providing legal services and
would succeed only by providing sound legal judgment to consumers,
as is the case now. Indeed, if the stock of the firm were publicly traded,
the value of a firm's stock would directly reflect the market's percep-
tion of the ability of the firm to render quality, professional legal serv-
ices. To the extent that the law firm's reputation is tarnished because it
provides inadequate services, the stockholders stand to lose. As a result,
stockholders would be acting to their own detriment by interfering with
the professional independence and judgment of a firm's lawyer-
employees, thereby diminishing the quality of the legal services offered.
As one commentator noted, "it is puzzling that this thesis is maintained
in a society in which the profit motive otherwise is thought to lead to the
production of goods and services for which there is consumer de-
mand." ''
For example, it seems implausible that the stockholders of Salomon
Bros., an investment banking firm, would attempt to interfere, via the
Board of Directors or upper management, with the professional judg-
ment of the firm's professionals. The perceived quality of that profes-
sional judgment is exactly what customers are buying and, ultimately,
87. See, e.g., Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of Non-Lawyer
Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 593, 611-12 (1994). According to Carson,
"A non-lawyer partner's primary concern is likely to be a good return on his investment." Id. (citing
Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741, 745 (1988) ("The
chief characteristic that distinguishes [a business] from a profession is the motivation of business
people. Business people are egoistic; their primary motivation, according to economic theory, is to
maximize their self-interest.")).
88. See Andrews, supra note 41, at 605.
89. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 38 (Feb. 8,
1983) (remarks by Al Conant)). According to Andrews, the House of Delegates Transcript is
"necessarily unofficial since the ABA has not released an official transcript to the public." Id. at 595
n.107.
90. Id. at 602.
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what stockholders are counting on for their return on investment. In
short, the dynamics of the marketplace actually militate against the no-
tion that nonlawyer investors would interfere with the lawyer's profes-
sional independence and judgment.
A parallel example of such consumer backlash is found in the
changes in attitudes toward managed care over the last several years.
Over a decade ago, doctors began feeling heavy pressures to find
quicker, cheaper methods of caring for patients, often to the patient's
detriment." Presently, however, patients are speaking out and opposing
non-physician dictated policies such as mandatory maximum hospital
stays. Patients have begun to turn the tide in the health care debate and
have recast the debate in a different light. 2
The argument that shareholder interference will undermine inde-
pendent judgment also assumes that by not practicing in a publicly-
traded law firm, for example, lawyers will otherwise be immune from
any pressure to maximize profits. Given today's competitive market-
place, this argument cannot pass muster. Private firms, especially large
corporate firms that would be ideal candidates for going public, are as
concerned with maximizing the bottom-line as other non-law busi-
nesses. Indeed, "there is no reason to suppose that corporations or lay-
men engage in the 'sordid' business of making money any more than
do traditional law firms."93 Those opposing nonlawyer investment sim-
ply have not demonstrated that "nonlawyer control is more pernicious,
or more efficacious, in interfering with a lawyer's professional inde-
pendence, than the control by supervising or employer attorneys that is
allowed currently."94
This is not to suggest that nonlawyer investors in the marketplace
will not show any interest in the decisions and judgment of the lawyers
in whom they are investing. On the contrary, because stockholders
would invest in law firms for the main purpose of making money, they
will be keenly interested in the return on their capital. Yet, to draw
91. See George J. Church, Ouch! Ouch! Ouch!' This Will Hurt: As Budget Cuts Loom, Yelps Are
Being Heard, TimE, Feb. 24, 1986, at 18 (discussing how hospitals in the mid-1980's were
"discharging many Medicare patients early-'sicker and quicker,' as many doctors put it").
92. See Michael Kramer, Road to the White House, TiuE, Fall 1996, at 14 (proposing that one
reason President Clinton was able to achieve re-election after seeing his first term's national health
care proposals go down in defeat was his adoption of proposals such as a bill to mandate a longer
hospital stay after a woman gives birth, an issue that had grown more important as managed health
care providers had been discharging women after shorter and shorter hospital stays).
93. Andrews, supra note 41, at 602.
94. Id. at 607. Andrews also points out that:
[m]any lawyers work for a salary as associates for law firms in which they have no control
or ownership interest. Their employers--the partners or lawyer shareholders-may be
looking over the shoulders of those associates 'in terms of profit' just as aggressively as
would nonlawyers offering the services of these same lawyers.
Id. at 606.
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another analogy between law and medicine, doctors continuously prac-
tice medicine while functioning in a similar principal-agent relationship.
Doctors must adhere to their professional obligations to their patients
against outside pressures from principals, such as hospital administrators
and benefactors, to keep costs down and focus on efficiency. Similarly,
lawyers could remain faithful to their professional obligations to their
clients against any pressures from nonlawyer shareholders.
Ultimately, investors in a law firm will want to see a return on their
investment. However, the typical investor lacks the ability to monitor the
daily efforts of that law firm. It is either impossible or too costly for the
investor/principal to monitor the lawyer/agent constantly. 5 In the field
of law, in which the typical nonlawyer investor will have less under-
standing of the services that the lawyer is providing than may be the
case in other service businesses, one might raise the concern that this
unfamiliarity will allow the law firm to fail to honor the fiduciary duties
it owes to its shareholders.
Just as in other corporate contexts, this problem can be alleviated
by numerous protections. Currently, corporate statutes mandate the fi-
duciary duties that corporations owe to their shareholders. These statutes
often go even further by dictating duties owed to directors, officers, and
employees in the closely held corporation context. Based on this prece-
dent, there is no reason that states could not enact statutes requiring
certain fiduciary duties to shareholders of professional corporations.
Similar provisions could be incorporated into rules of professional con-
duct, bringing an additional forum for enforcement. Incentives could
also be built into the principal-agent relationship between investors and
law firms. As in other businesses, tying profitability, a direct result of
excellent client representation, to vehicles such as incentive stock op-
tions would give additional impetus to lawyers to remain faithful to both
their clients and their investors.
Finally, it must be remembered that the lawyers will continue to be
the persons actually providing legal services and advice directly to the
clients. Practicing in a law firm with nonlawyer investors will no more
release attorneys from their ethical obligations in rendering services
than practicing as in-house counsel in a large professional corporation
does now.96 The ABA has recognized that lawyers operating under the
authority of laymen must uphold the Rules. In 1970, the ABA issued an
95. See JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS 98 (1992) (discussing the
difference between a situation in which a principal is able to observe an agent's work versus a
situation in which the principal is separated from the agent in some form).
96. The current rule that prohibits lawyers from practicing in a professional corporation obtains
only if "a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer." Thus, it
need not be changed to allow law fi-ms to go public. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5A(d)(3) (1983).
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ethics opinion regarding the scope of authority that the Board of
Directors of a Legal Aid Society may exercise.97 In light of these factors,
those considering change should not be persuaded by the argument that
allowing law firms to have nonlawyer investors would inevitably result in
interference with the professional judgment of lawyers."
C. Breaching of Client Confidences
Another commonly cited reason for prohibiting nonlawyers from
investing or exercising managerial authority in law firms is the fear that
lawyers will leak client confidences to nonlawyers who have no ethical
duty to maintain confidentiality. Under other circumstances, this con-
cern regarding the sanctity of client confidentiality would be well
placed. Holding inviolate the confidential information of the client not
only facilitates full development of the facts essential to the client's
proper representation, it also encourages the public to seek early legal
assistance.99 Only under the guarantee of confidentiality will clients seek
97. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970). The Opinion laid out
principles to govern the relationship between the board of directors of the Legal Aid Society and the
society's staff attorneys:
(1) The board's functions are limited to formulating broad goals and policies pertaining
to the operation of the society.
(2) To this end, the board may establish guidelines respecting the categories or kinds of
clients staff attorneys may represent and the types of cases they may handle.
(4) Staff attorneys should endeavor at all times to fulfill the broad policies formulated
by the board and should insure that their conduct in representing clients or causes is in
conformity with the [applicable ethical standards].
i6i Once the attorney has accepted a client or case of the nature and type sanctioned
by board policy, the board must take special precautions not to interfere with its attorney's
independent professional judgment in the handling of the matter.
Id. The Committee believed that these principles would be sufficient to guide the lawyers and the
board of directors in their relationships with each other and with clients. Those legal aid societies
following these principles would receive the blessings of the ABA. The opinion was issued while the
Code of Professional Responsibility was the most recent set of ABA rules, but the substance of the
opinion has not been overruled with the adoption of the Model Rules. The ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility noted that Rule 5.4(d) of the Model Rules does not apply to nonprofit
organizations. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 460 (1992) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
98. In any event, a law firm wishing to issue stock to the public could state in its prospectus, as
Steven Brill suggests, that "maximizing shareholder return is not the firm's sole goal or even its
constant priority-and then let the marketplace decide if the shares are a good buy." Steven Brill,
Psst-Wanna Buy a Hot Stock?, A?. LAw., Nov. 1987, at 3, 102. Brill also suggests that lawyers
could retain "a separate, voting dominant class of insider stock for the senior practicing lawyers" to
avoid any potential interference from nonlawyers. Id. In the same vein, a reasonable compromise
would be to permit nonlawyer investment in law firms, but require that lawyers retain all management
authority, responsibility, and accountability. Such a compromise would address the major concern of
opponents-nonlawyers exerting control over the firm's lawyers-while still introducing law firms
into the marketplace.
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 (1983).
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this assistance and then communicate fully and frankly with their law-
yer.1° However, again the fear of critics is misplaced. Model Rule 5.3
specifically addresses this argument, providing that:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or as-
sociated with a lawyer:
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a per-
son that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved.... "'
Thus, Rule 5.3 would continue to serve as a strong incentive for law
firms with nonlawyer investors to maintain client confidences. In current
practice, nonlawyer employees are necessarily privy to confidential cli-
ent information in law firms across the country. In addition, countless
nonlawyer professionals retained by lawyers for expert help have access
to client confidences. Despite these nonlawyers' knowledge of client
matters, law firms have not been plagued by nonlawyers breaking client
confidences.
Even assuming that a nonlawyer manager may be able to access
confidential information, one commentator has pointed out that "even
if nonlawyers do not have as broad a duty of confidentiality under tra-
ditional agency rules as is imposed under the lawyer ethics codes, non-
lawyer professionals are free to agree to a broader duty of
confidentiality as a contractual matter."'1' More convincingly, any
breach of confidentiality by a nonlawyer would be to the great detri-
ment of the firm itself. In the investment banking business, for example,
maintaining client confidences is of paramount importance. For this
reason, almost all professional services agreements between investment
banks and their clients include a strict confidentiality clause, binding all
employees from the mail person to the highest managing director.
There is no reason why such agreements could not be made as a
matter of course between law firms with nonlawyer investors and their
clients. Such agreements are already common to litigation services pro-
viders, who hire nonlawyers to assist in cost-effective preparation of liti-
gation paperwork for large law firms. Employees at such firms are
required to sign confidentiality agreements because they are exposed to
confidential client documents and attorney work-product. Employees
within law firms owned by nonlawyers could enter into similar agree-
ments.
100. See id. Rule 1.6 cmts. 3,4.
101. Id.Rule5.3.
102. Andrews, supra note 41, at 615-16.
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Finally, the ABA opinion regarding the relationship between the
board of directors of legal services societies and the societies' staff at-
torneys discusses client confidences and places limitations on attorneys'
rights to disclose these confidences to their superiors. 3 These limita-
tions could be equally applied to incorporated law firms.
In a related vein, Model Rule 1.6 currently allows lawyers to make
disclosures that are "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the rep-
resentation.""° Furthermore, if a lawyer decides it is necessary to dis-
close confidential information to a nonlawyer for some reason, the
lawyer can also ask for the client's consent to disclose the informa-
tion. 05 In view of the foregoing, there is no reason to believe that client
confidences would be less protected by a publicly held law firm, for ex-
ample, than by any other law firm.
D. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Another fear held by those who oppose ending the prohibition on
nonlawyer investment and management of law firms is that it will lead to
the unauthorized practice of law. Critics suggest that, although such
trespasses onto the protected turf of lawyers may not be purposeful,
they will occur accidentally.Ies Critics argue that this may occur because
the limits of the practice of law are undefined and differ by jurisdic-
tion. 7 But it is these very definitional differences that show this fear to
be unfounded.
Many states, for example, place the power to draft real estate
documents solely in the hands of lawyers. However, in 1962, Arizona
chose to grant real estate brokers and salespersons the concurrent
103. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970) ("The board may require
staff attorneys to disclose to the board such information about their clients and cases as is reasonably
necessary to determine whether the board's policies are being carried out."). This broad provision
was later limited by an opinion that approved provisions from Informal Opinions 1081 and 1287 that
required client anonymity be preserved in communications with the society's board, and also required
that a staff attorney receive the knowledgeable consent of the client before divulging client
confidences or secrets to others. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 334 (1974). Although the ABA noted that nonprofit organizations are not subject to the
requirements of Rule 5A(d), it emphasized that such organizations must comply with Rule 1.6 on
client confidences. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 97, at 460.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
105. See i
106. It is suggested, for example, that a real estate agent partnered with a tax or real estate
lawyer may discuss the tax results of a proposed real estate transaction. If this took place in a real
estate office, the client may question the validity of the advice; but if the same comment is given in a
law office, it may carry more weight with the client. See Carson, supra note 87, at 615-16; see also In
re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1345 (N.J.
1995) (finding residential real estate brokers and title company officers may conduct real estate
transactions that involve many aspects of the practice of law, provided they warn customers of their
conflicting interests and of the risk of not being represented by an attorney).
107. See Carson, supra note 87, at 615-17.
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authority to draft such documents. Since then, these nonlawyers have
been serving client needs, and, after over thirty years, there is no hard
evidence to indicate that clients have received poor advice or service as a
result of Arizona's choice.' 8
Additionally, law firms have grown to include a variety of non-
lawyer types who successfully avoid practicing law. Law firms employ
paralegals, legal secretaries, and other nonlawyer personnel who con-
stantly deal with clients. These nonlawyers may not give legal advice to
clients, and they may not take other actions that might be construed as
the practice of law. If they violate this rule, the lawyer or law firm em-
ployer may be responsible for the violation.' °9 If these employees and
assistants of lawyers can coexist within the bounds of the ethics rules,
nonlawyer investors and partners can as well.
A lawyer who enters into business with nonlawyers remains bound
by the applicable rules of conduct. Supervising lawyers are required to
ensure that the conduct of nonlawyers is "compatible with the profes-
sional obligations of the lawyer."110 Compliance with these rules re-
quires that lawyers not assist nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of
law,111 not share client confidences with unauthorized persons,"' and not
allow the nonlawyer to affect the lawyer's independent professional
judgment."'
One additional criticism surrounding attempts to allow lawyers to
become partners with nonlawyers is that it presents the opportunity to
practice law without a license."4 The fear is that this may be a back-door
into legal practice for law school graduates who cannot pass the bar or
for disbarred lawyers. The reality is that the rules requiring lawyers to
be responsible for such nonlawyers' actions apply in this case, just as
they do for paralegals or any other nonlawyer. It is also unlikely that
abuses of this nature will be common; few practicing attorneys are likely
to avail themselves of the services of those found not worthy of admis-
sion to the bar or those whose ethics resulted in disbarment.
Existing rules and standards of ethical conduct already provide for
nearly all contingencies that a lawyer may face regarding the unauthor-
ized practice of law. Allowing nonlawyers to invest passively in law
108. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 39, at 404.
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 5.3(b)-(c) (1983).
110. Id. Rule 5.3(b). Rule 5.3(c) also states that a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of a
nonlawyer employee if the lawyer orders or ratifies the specific conduct involved, or if the lawyer is
a partner in the firm in which the nonlawyer is employed and knows in advance of inappropriate
conduct, but fails to take remedial action. See id. Rule 5.3(c).
111. See id. Rule 5.5(b).
112. See id. Rule 1.6(a); see also supra Part II.C. and accompanying notes.
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1983); see also supra Part
II.B. and accompanying notes.
114. See Carson, supra note 87, at 617.
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firms or to work beside nonlawyers would not change this situation.
Lawyers would continue to practice law, and nonlawyers would continue
to avoid practicing law. The benefits of a business association between a
lawyer and a nonlawyer arise not through unauthorized legal work but
rather through the provision of ancillary services and through virtually
unlimited capitalization from the financial markets.
E. Transformation of the Legal Profession Into a Business
A final criticism aimed at proposals to change the ethics rules to
allow nonlawyer investment in law firms is that the change will denigrate
the legal profession to a mere business."5 Critics who hold this position
claim that a law firm owned by nonlawyers will focus on cost-cutting to
maximize shareholder value at the expense of client service.
These critics fail to see that over the last ten years, the legal
"profession" has undergone changes that arguably warrant renaming it
the legal services "business.""' 6 Today more than ever, lawyers run their
firms like traditional businesses."7 The tremendous competition among
law firms has forced law firm owners, their partners, and shareholders to
become more concerned with profits and efficiency. Those managing
private, for-profit law firms have realized the stark reality that their law
firms must be viewed as businesses in order to survive in this competitive
marketplace. Indeed, one commentator bluntly stated, "[Law firms] that
were once synonymous with equability, professionalism and familial
spirit have been molded by harsh economic forces into large, disputa-
tious businesses.""'
A rapidly changing legal economy has provided the impetus for
this new focus on the business of managing law firms. The Altman Weil
115. See iaL at 605-08.
116. See id. According to Carson:
The definition of the term "profession" is by no means universally agreed upon.
Traditionally, a business might be defined as an entity that promotes the greatest societal
good by maximizing its profit, whereas a profession might be defined as an entity that seeks
to promote the greatest societal good by maximizing its service....
The reality today, of course, is that very few people would choose a profession without
regard to its potential profitability. The difficulty arises when professional decisions are
driven solely by profitability.
Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted).
117. See Ward Bower, Surviving the 1990s, LAw PRAC. MGMrr., July-Aug. 1990, at 25, 26-28.
Established law firms will shift from "fraternal" organizations, characterized by
collegiality, seniority advancement and compensation and consensus decision-making, to a
"business" approach, characterized by interpartner accountability, merit-based
compensation and centralized management. Economic realities of law practice, combined
with competitive and marketplace pressures, will lead more lawyers to leave the profession
and to seek employment in other areas.
Id.
118. S.S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from Management
Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 645,645 (1990).
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Pensa Survey of Law Firm Economics showed that per-lawyer overhead
increased more than 81% over the last ten years, while per-lawyer reve-
nues increased only 73%.119 This trend reflects what was already hap-
pening during the previous ten years, from 1975 to 1985, when
overhead increased by 161%, gross per-attorney receipts rose only
123%, and average partner compensation went up only 90%.12
At the same time, competition among lawyers has increased. The
United States has approximately 900,000 lawyers today, up almost 40%
from ten years ago. Moreover, the United States has 336 law firms
with over 100 lawyers and over 700 more with over 60 lawyers. 22 Three
law firms have over 1,000 lawyers, yet in 1980 those same three firms
had less than 300 lawyers."z
In addition to the huge increase in the number of lawyers and the
attendant squeeze on profits, lawyers are also working more. From 1985
to 1989, the average associate hours billed rose from 1738 to 1820, and
partners' hours increased from 1571 to 1706. Many firms now set an-
nual goals of 2000 hours or more.1'2
Unlike other businesses, during this transformation law firms have
been deprived of a favored source of capital-equity capital from the
private, passive investor. The ABA's Model Rules' prohibition against
nonlawyer investment is fraught with irony. While its proponents claim
the rule is necessary to protect the integrity of the "profession," real
economic pressures threaten to undermine the integrity of the profes-
sion in law offices across the country on a daily basis, as lawyers fre-
quently struggle to make ends meet to stay in business rather than to
serve deserving, destitute potential clients or the legal system as a whole.
Access to the public equity markets could ease these pressures.
III
THE CURRENT OPTIONS FOR LAW FIRM ORGANIZATION
Despite the current inability to incorporate law firms or associate
with interests owned by nonlawyers, there are many organizational
forms available to lawyers. Each of these organizational forms has its
advantages, yet none offers the same mix of attributes that would exist
119. See Ward Bower, Economic Trends in the Legal Profession: Planning Implications for Law
Firms, ARiz. ATr'Y, May, 1996, at 16, 17.
120. See Susan Raridon, The Practice of Law: The Next 50 Years, LEGAL EcoN., Apr. 1989, at
31.
121. See id
122. See id. at 18.
123. See id
124. See Amee McKim, Comment, The Lawyer Track: The Case for Humanizing the Career
Within a Large Law Firm, 55 OHIO ST. I.J. 167, 174 (1994); see also Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an
Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 924 (1996) (noting that, in one study of Chicago law firms,
30% of all lawyers billed at least 2000 hours a year).
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in an incorporated law firm with nonlawyer investors. Understanding
these current forms will also demonstrate that the fears of critics who
oppose law firm nonlawyer investment or incorporation are unfounded.
There are five main organizational forms currently available to law
firms: sole proprietorships, traditional partnerships, limited liability
companies, limited liability partnerships, and professional corporations.
Each of these forms has advantages and disadvantages, and each organi-
zation of lawyers must determine which form best fits its desired struc-
ture. Unfortunately, for some groups of lawyers, none of these forms
compares to the forbidden benefits of the private or public corporation.
A. Sole Proprietorships
Sole proprietorships are the most basic form of organization for
any business, including law practice. The sole proprietorship is a simple
organizational form and offers the benefits of flow-through taxation.
The owner has complete control and great flexibility in the business
dealings of the firm. However, the owner-lawyer must devote much of
his or her time to the day-to-day management of the firm.
One major drawback of the sole proprietorship is that it is the only
organizational form that exposes the law firm and its owner-lawyer to
unlimited liability. This liability extends beyond the owner-lawyer's
investment in the firm; after taking all the firm's assets, claimants may
go after the owner-lawyer's personal property. The cost of unlimited
liability can be limited through the purchase of various forms of insur-
ance, but this simply spreads the cost over time through insurance pre-
miums and does not limit the liability itself.
A sole proprietorship law firm also faces significant hurdles in the
area of capitalization. Personal investment by the attorney-owner is the
sole form of equity capitalization available to a sole proprietorship law
firm. This makes the sole proprietorship unavailable to many lawyers
because they simply do not have the capital to create and run a firm
through the formation years, when the firm's cash flow is negative.
For these reasons, the sole proprietorship is often not the best
choice for lawyers. For many practitioners, the drawbacks of increased
liability, limited capitalization, and lost management time outweigh the
benefits of sole control and flow-through taxation. These practitioners
must look to other forms of organization.
B. Traditional Partnerships
Since the first law firm was organized, the traditional choice of law
firm structure has always been the partnership. The reasons lawyers
choose the partnership form of organization vary, but some of the more
prevalent reasons include ease of administration and various tax
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advantages."z Additionally, lawyers expect that their share of partner-
ship profits will exceed the profits that they could have earned practic-
ing in sole proprietorships. These profits may be split evenly among the
firm's partners, or they may be split according to some ratio set in their
partnership agreement.
While partnerships enjoy many advantages over sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships face many drawbacks when compared to corpora-
tions. Partnership's major advantage is that income receives flow-
through taxation, thereby preserving more income for the partners. The
corresponding downside to this tax treatment is that partners, like sole
proprietors, cannot defer income realization in order to lower their tax
burden.
Other drawbacks to partnership include limited life, unlimited li-
ability, 26 and limited capitalization opportunities. Partnerships, like all
non-corporate business forms, face difficulty in raising the capital nec-
essary to start and grow a business. Partnerships receive their funds only
through the individual contributions of their partners and the income
generated by the partnership itself. Although partnerships may sell lim-
ited partner interests, Model Rule 5.4 prohibits selling limited partner
interests to nonlawyers by prohibiting sharing legal fees with nonlawy-
ers 7 Thus, partnerships have no way of overcoming the limits on ac-
cess to capital.
C. Limited Liability Companies
The limited liability corporation ("LLC") has emerged as an or-
ganizational form that may provide the benefits of both corporations
and partnerships. 28 LLCs offer the flow-through tax advantages enjoyed
by partnerships along with the highly valued limited liability attributes
125. See Sheldon I. Banoff, New Ruling Adds Further Encouragement for Large Firms to Form
LLCs, J. TAX'N, July 1994, at 12, 12.
126. A San Francisco jury in 1994 ordered the nation's largest law firm, Baker & McKenzie, to
pay $6.9 million in punitive damages (later reduced by half) to a former secretary who brought a
sexual harassment claim against the firm and one of its partners. The individual partner who was
responsible for the harassment was also ordered to pay $225,000 in punitive damages. Charles
Burress, Largest Law Firm Will Appeal $3.5 Million Harassment Award, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 1994,
at A23.
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4(a) (1983). Recall that, except in
limited circumstances involving nonlawyer employees like secretaries and paralegals or involving
payments to a lawyer's estate, neither a lawyer nor a law firm may share legal fees with a
nonlawyer. See id. A lawyer also cannot form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the partnership consists of practicing law. See id. Rule 5A(b). Moreover, a lawyer cannot practice
for a profit in the form of a professional corporation or professional association if a nonlawyer owns
any interest or occupies any position of control in the organization. See id. Rule 5.4(d).
128. For a more detailed analysis of LLCs, see generally Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the
Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L REv. 44 (1992);
Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies: Considerations in Choosing a Business Entity, 836
PLI/CORP. 171 (1994).
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of a corporation. More specifically, practicing in LLC form may protect
personal assets from liability, except liability arising from the lawyer's
own direct or supervisory liability for errors and omissions in rendering
professional assistance. 29 In addition, under revised Internal Revenue
Service regulations effective January 1, 1997, the LLC is taxed as a
flow-through entity."3
The main drawback of an LLC is its novelty; the form is so new
that courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies have yet to answer all of
the questions it raises. For example, it is unclear which corporate and
partnership law doctrines will apply to LLCs, since LLCs share attributes
of both of these forms. Additional questions include: What liability
protection does an LLC afford its investors against claims made in a
state that does not allow LLCs? How are LLCs treated under state tax
laws in states that do not allow LLCs? What liability protection does the
LLC grant to professionals organized as a Professional Limited Liability
Company? Until these questions are answered, and until the LLC or-
ganizational form is accepted in all 50 states, many businesses, including
law firms, will choose not to adopt the LLC form.
While the LLC form of organization appears to offer law firms the
best of both the corporation and partnership forms, the uncertainties
associated with this new form may leave lawyers in search of a limited
liability entity that does not confront roadblocks such as the ABA's
Model Rules and Code. The answer to their problems may well be an
even newer form of limited liability organization, the Limited Liability
Partnership ("LLP").
D. Limited Liability Partnerships
An LLP is effectively a general partnership with a few significant
alterations. The primary contrast with a partnership is that legislation
limits the personal liability of a partner in an LLP.13' LLPs were created
in reaction to LLCs and are intended to give partnerships some of the
protection afforded LLCs without forcing the partnerships to alter their
structure in order to achieve this protection.'
129. See Banoff, supra note 125, at 12.
130. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21, 989 (1996) (replacing
former Kintner regulations); see generally John H. Matheson and Brent A. Olson, A Callfor a Unified
Business Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L REv. 1 (1996).
131. See Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships-The Next Wave,
INSIGHTS, May 1994, at 23, 23-26.
132. See David B. Rae, Limited Liability Partnership: The Time to Become One is Now, 30 Hous.
LAw. 47 (JanJFeb. 1993).
1998]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Texas enacted the first LLP legislation in 1991,"' followed by
Louisiana in 1992," and Delaware in 1993.115 In 1994, various other
jurisdictions followed the trend and enacted their own LLP legislation
(e.g., North Carolina 3 6 and the District of Columbia'). Some states that
have not yet enacted their own LLP legislation, such as New Jersey, have
nonetheless adopted legislation that specifically permits an LLP formed
under the laws of another state to conduct business in the state. 38
The main attractive feature of an LLP is that it limits a partner's
liability, although an LLP does not eliminate all such liability. An LLP
continues to be fully liable for allclaims against the LLP itself, and all
of the partnership assets remain at risk in connection with any such li-
ability.'39 Furthermore, a partner in an LLP continues to be liable for the
partner's own tortious conduct, for certain tortious conduct committed
by others, and, under some statutes, for certain contractual obligations
of the partnership."4'
In the context of the legal profession, the typical LLP statute does
not provide liability protection to a partner who gives specific direction
to, and supervises the daily activities of, an associate. In contrast, the
chair of a department in a law firm, who sets general policy for the firm,
but who is not personally involved in a matter where negligence occurs,
would not be exposed to liability. 4' "Similarly, two partners working on
a matter independently of each other, neither of whom is viewed as su-
pervising and controlling the other, should be able to argue that since
they acted independently of each other, they should not be exposed to
liability for the conduct of the other."'42
Although LLPs, like LLCs, appear to be a savior for partners
who practice under the specter of unlimited vicarious liability, they too
are not perfect. In fact, as with LLCs, one of the more salient
133. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132B (West 1997); 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 917
(providing that as of January 1, 1994, most Texas LLPs are governed by Texas State House Bill No.
273, which was enacted as the Texas Revised Partnership Act and codified as 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
917).
134. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431 (West 1997).
135. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1547 (1993).
136. See 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 354.
137. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-101 to-148 (1990).
138. See 1993 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 210 (West).
139. See Libaroff, supra note 131, at 24.
140. See id. at 24-25.
141. See id. at 25.
142. Id. The problem with LLPs is that it is not entirely clear as to what constitutes "supervision"
or "direction," and consequently, it is difficult to determine the extent to which a partner remains
liable for various actions. However, the list of excused conduct in LLP legislation does appear to
have its origin in the provisions of various professional corporation statutes. For example, Delaware
uses the same "negligent, wrongful acts, or misconduct" language in both its professional corporation
statutes and its LLP legislation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 608 (1991).
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imperfections is the lack of well developed enabling statutes. This, for-
tunately, will come with time. Moreover, LLPs, like LLCs, are untested in
the courts under many situations in which organizational form is criti-
cal. Additionally, many questions remain regarding the recognition of
LLPs and LLCs in states which do not have LLP and LLC statutes. For
these reasons, many partnerships have chosen not to become LLPs.
Finally, the limits on raising capital from nonlawyer investors are
the same in an LLP as in a traditional partnership." Essentially, if any
part of a business involves the practice of law, nonlawyers are forbidden
from investing in the business, participating in management, and sharing
in the business' profits.'"
E. Professional Corporations
Professional corporations ("PC"s) are also a new addition to the
business associations arena. PCs are corporations comprised of one or
more professionals. PCs offer the advantage of limited liability and al-
low tax benefits not available to partnerships. Specifically, PCs were cre-
ated to circumvent limitations on partnerships and LLPs regarding the
taxation of contributions to retirement plans.45 Normally, an organiza-
tion is allowed to contribute to the retirement plans of its employees and
to treat those contributions as a business expense. Contributions on be-
half of owners, however, do not receive this favored tax treatment. Such
contributions come out of the sole owner's or partners' after-tax dol-
lars, and do not result in a business expense deduction for the firm. By
forming a PC, partners are treated as employees rather than owners, and
contributions to their retirement plans therefore receive the favored tax
treatment. PCs enjoy other minor tax benefits also available to corpora-
tions.
PCs have also been used to create a hybrid organizational form in
which each lawyer forms his own PC as the sole shareholder, and then
the PCs of each lawyer join in a general partnership. This PC form limits
the liability of the lawyers, provides favored tax treatment to their re-
tirement plans, and provides flow-through taxation.
Congress eventually came to view the partnership of PCs and the
tax leeway granted PCs regarding employee retirement plans as abuses
of the tax system. In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) 146 which lowered the maximum contribu-
tion of PCs to employee retirement plans. This removed the major tax
143. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibitions against investment
and involvement in law firms under Rule 5.4 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
144. See id.
145. Curt C. Brewer, IV, Comment, North Carolina's Limited Liability Company Act: A
Legislative Mandate for Professional Limited Liability, 29 WAKE Forr L. REv. 857, 860 (1994).
146. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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benefit of establishing a PC; however, other minor tax benefits remain
which, coupled with the limited liability found in PCs, have fueled some
continued growth in the popularity of PCs as an organizational form.'
Although these five organizational forms currently available to law
firms share a variety of control, tax and liability advantages and disad-
vantages, none of these forms allows firms the virtually unlimited ability
to raise capital through the financial markets. Only status as a corpora-
tion would allow this. Depriving lawyers of the opportunity to form
corporations and to utilize nonlawyer investments in both these organ-
izational forms and the corporate .form limits the ability of these busi-
ness associations to grow and compete in the national marketplace. This
artificial limit keeps law firms smaller than their optimum size, limits
opportunities for growth and expansion, and hinders crucial invest-
ments.
IV
WHY LAW FIRMS SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO THE BIG BOARD
No one can predict exactly how allowing law firms to utilize capital
contributions of nonlawyer investors, by going public, for example,
would impact the legal profession. The profession has suffered, how-
ever, as a result of economic pressures wrought by competition in the
marketplace. It may be that allowing law firms access to the equity mar-
kets would result in law firms that are optimally capitalized and there-
fore more efficient. As it stands today, partners, or their shareholder
counterparts, provide all of the equity financing for law firms. While law
firms are typically characterized as "labor-intensive" rather than
"capital intensive," their capital needs are increasing as technology
plays a larger role in the delivery of legal services. Furthermore, the no-
tion that because law firms are "labor-intensive" they are not "capital
intensive" fails to recognize that many law firms invest significant
amounts of money training and developing associates.
In short, many law firms would benefit by having access to the eq-
uity markets. The equity markets would provide law firms with neces-
sary capital for expansion into new geographical areas, thereby better
serving consumers' needs through greater access to legal services and
increased competition in the local marketplace. This capital infusion
would also allow investment in new technologies, again providing better
legal services for the consumer. Assuming law firms are indeed "labor
intensive," law firms train a great percentage of the profession's future
leaders; with greater capital, this task becomes more efficient. Moreover,
law firms often serve society best in their ability to take on large and
147. See Brewer, supra note 145, at 860-61.
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financially risky contingency fee cases. Many of these cases require
enormous capital outlay years before any repayment can be expected.
The capital that firms could raise in the equity markets could assist in
financing these cases, serving plaintiffs who would otherwise go unrep-
resented.
A. Capital for Expansion
Many businesses choose to raise capital for expansion by selling
shares to selected investors in a private placement or to the public via an
initial public stock offering. Unlike these businesses, however, the legal
profession must utilize internally generated capital to finance expan-
sion. Today, a law firm wishing to expand into a new geographic market
has two options: (a) merge with an established local firm, or (b) establish
a new satellite office.
While either option may lead to the growth of the individual firm,
the second option is preferable from a societal perspective. Consumer
choice within the targeted geographical market only increases when a
firm commits itself to establishing a new satellite office. Since geo-
graphic expansion through merger or some other equivalent transaction
does not constitute expansion of the legal profession in absolute terms,
the public will benefit from real growth of the legal profession only if a
law firm risks capital in the hope of cultivating new clients to serve
through its satellite office.'48 To the extent real growth can be achieved,
the legal profession better meets the legal needs of consumers and soci-
ety. In any event, if real growth cannot be achieved, consumers will at
least benefit from increased competition in the local marketplace. For
these reasons, law firm expansion should be viewed as a positive goal.
The costs associated with establishing a new satellite office, how-
ever, are daunting. Indeed, a firm wishing to expand must make a
standing commitment to finance all of the satellite office's start-up ex-
penses'49 and operating expenses until the office breaks even. The law
firm must make such a commitment knowing that internally generated
capital will generally be the primary source of funds required for ex-
pansion."s Moreover, new ventures may fall short of meeting even the
most conservative break-even projections. In such circumstances, the law
148. An expanding law firm that derives all of its new business by taking clients away from other
local, or even remote, firms does not generate real "industry" growth unless those firms from whom
the clients were taken subsequently attract new clients.
149. Start-up costs typically include, but are not limited to, expenses for leasehold improvements,
office equipment, office furniture, initial marketing and client development, and capital to last
through the initial period before payment is received for services.
150. Conventional bank financing is a less attractive alternative because the debt payments
constitute an additional cash flow burden. With equity financing there is no concomitant obligatory
cash flow burden.
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firm must then make the difficult choice whether to abandon the ven-
ture and cut the loss or to ante up additional capital.
If law firms have access to nonlawyer equity capital, they will be
better positioned to consider expanding into new markets. Firms will be
able to design a new office as a wholly owned subsidiary and issue stock
ownership in the new office. This will allow the new law firm, like other
start-up companies, to rely on the capital of those who believe in the
firm's future return on that investment. This capital can see the firm
through the initial lean years that face a new law office as it seeks a
niche in the marketplace or attempts to gain market share. Allowing
nonlawyer investment would serve all the parties involved: lawyers with
the existing firm would gain a presence in a new city, expanding the
firm's prestige as well as increasing its resources and prosperity; attor-
neys at the new law office would have access to the resources, expertise,
and support of an existing law firm, as well as the capital that can come
from the investment markets; and investors would have access to a new
investment vehicle.
B. Capital for Investment in New Technologies
The utility of computer assisted legal practice increases daily. To-
day, lawyers and their staffs use computers for performing complicated
conflicts analysis, minimizing work-in-process (by automatically track-
ing, calculating, and billing for the time and resources expended on a
project), accessing Westlaw, LEXIS/NEXIS and the Internet, and com-
municating with other lawyers and staff via e-mail. Indeed, lawyers are
using computers outside the office to assist them in their practice both
in the courtroom and in the boardroom.
Given the rapid pace of technological advancement, computers and
other new technology-based equipment can only assume a more promi-
nent role in law practice as time goes on. Yet the benefits of new tech-
nologies carry a high price tag. Allowing law firms to have access to
equity capital would put them in a better position to invest in new tech-
nologies and, ultimately, to become more efficient providers of legal
services.
Brokerage firms faced this situation in the late 1960s. With stock
trading volume up, and trades themselves becoming more complex,
brokerages needed to update their technology to clear up the "back-
office mess that had crippled all Wall Street brokerages."'' Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. led the way for other Wall Street brokerage
houses when it announced its intention to go public and to use the
151. Brill, supra note 98, at 3.
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proceeds to update its equipment.' The plan worked for DLJ, and other
brokerages soon followed suit. 53
Investment in technology for a law firm can be a double-edged
sword. It may very well increase the firm's efficiency, but in a profes-
sion that traditionally bills by the hour, the perverse result of the invest-
ment may well be less income absent an increase in the volume of work
done. A shift from hourly billing to a fixed-fee system is likely as firms
introduce technological advances to their practice." Michael Arkfeld
provides an example of how this will happen. 55 A client retains a law
firm to handle numerous similar claims or types of cases. The client
asks the law firm to discount the average fee charged per case and use
that amount as a fixed fee. Such an arrangement spreads the risk and
encourages the law firm to become as efficient as possible, since it will
capture all the gains resulting from that increase in efficiency. The cli-
ent also wins by paying less, shifting some risk to the law firm, and
achieving some certainty in its legal costs. While the eventual outcome
of such a scheme is a win-win situation in the long run, the law firm
bears the cost of investing in the new technology to improve its effi-
ciency.5 6 By going public (or seeking other sources of nonlawyer capi-
tal), as the brokerages did, law firms will have access to capital to invest
more aggressively in technology, and will provide better, more efficient
services to clients at a lower cost.
C. Capital for Investment in New Lawyers
As one commentator put it, "a law firm is a service organization
whose most significant input is human capital."'5 7 For this reason, it is
essential that law firms invest in new associates. 58 This investment comes
in the form of training new lawyers and getting the new lawyer to invest
in "firm-specific human capital."' 59 Significantly, the law firm must
pay for the new employee's investment in firm-specific capital and
training." Given that this investment must be made in each new associ-
ate over a period of several years, a law firm's investment in human
capital can become quite substantial.
152. See iUj
153. See id.
154. See Michael R. Arkfeld, The Death of the Billable Hour?, Amz. Arr'y, July 1996, at 9.
155. See id
156. See id
157. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The
Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 571 (1989).
158. See id
159. Id at 573. "Firm-specific human capital" refers to "human capital which has a significantly
lower value if deployed outside the firm." Id.
160. See id.
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In the past, clients often shouldered the cost of training new associ-
ates through the traditional hourly billing system. Increasingly, however,
clients are demanding a shift to fixed-fee forms of billing and are ac-
tively seeking out the most cost-effective provider of various types of
legal services."' Sophisticated clients are also refusing to pick up the tab
for "on-the-job" training of new lawyers. As a result of this trend,
law firms must internalize these training costs, increasing their overhead.
Allowing law firms to go public or utilize other mechanisms for
nonlawyer investment would provide law firms with much needed capi-
tal to invest in new lawyers. This increased investment could result in
better trained and more efficient lawyers, enhancing the prestige of the
profession while simultaneously increasing the firm's value to share-
holders.
D. Financing Contingency Fee Cases
Like most other businesses, law firms also have "working capital"
requirements'63 that tie up substantial amounts of capital every day." 4
Additionally, whenever a law firm expands, its working capital require-
ments increase concomitantly. Many firms can finance working capital
requirements via traditional banking financing, such as lines of credit. 6
Plaintiffs' firms taking cases on a contingency fee basis, however, must
fund the substantial up-front costs with internally generated capital. 66
Because the plaintiffs' firm lacks access to outside capital, it can
only fund a limited number of cases on a contingency fee basis at any
one time. Cutting off access to equity capital may be a contributing
factor to "the small and seemingly suboptimal size of plaintiffs' firms"
in general. 6 While some might abhor the idea of allowing plaintiffs'
firms to finance litigation with private equity, those who view plaintiffs'
161. See Roberta Montafia, Arming the Masses: The Role of the Associate in Business
Development, BosToN B.J., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 4.
162. See id.
163. In accounting parlance, the term "working capital" refers specifically to current assets
minus current liabilities.
164. See Brill, supra note 98, at 3.
165. See Ward Bower & James Cotterman, Taking the Confusion Out of Capitalization, AM.
LAw., Oct. 1988, at 24, 25 ("[T]o obtain working capital, a line of credit may be a good alternative.
These have variable interest rates and are backed by security interests in all of the firm's assets,
including accounts receivable, work-in-process, and fixed assets.").
166. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L Rev. 669, 706 (1986) ("[B]anks probably lack the ability to appraise the future earnings prospects
of attorneys operating on a contingent fee basis (as compared to law firms with institutional
clients)."); see also id. at 706 nn.103-04 (noting that plaintiffs' firms lack access to equity markets
because of legal ethics rules and discussing the limited availability of traditional bank financing).
167. Id. at 706.
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firms as "private attorneys general" would welcome the opportunity to
raise money for their causes.
Allowing nonlawyer investment in law firms would permit greater
risk sharing in contingency fee cases, providing the basis for two major
improvements to the environment in which lawyers currently handle
these cases. The first improvement would allow law firms to take on
more cases in which a party's claim or cause appears meritorious, yet
the party's chances of success in the courts are in doubt. Law firms that
commit large sums of capital to these meritorious, yet uncertain, cases
face great risks. Risk-averse firms must reject many of these cases, leav-
ing deserving plaintiffs without representation. For an investor, however,
a law firm would be but one small aspect of the investor's diversified
portfolio. Within the collective group of investors in a publicly held law
firm, each investor's exposure to risk would be minimized by the in-
vestor's own diversification, allowing the law firm more leeway to take
on these less certain cases. 168 Lest anyone argue that this phenomenon
would grant law firms the freedom to gamble on overly risky or un-
meritorious cases, they merely need to recall that the public market will
quickly differentiate between those firms that do and do not select their
cases wisely.
The second improvement public ownership of law firms would
bring to contingency fee litigation springs from the maxim that
"[p]rofits come from seeking slight edges ... [and] a firm that is unad-
venturous does not earn high profits.' 69 It is true that firms that are less
risk-averse will realize more short-term setbacks than their more risk-
averse competitors; however, experience shows that accepting a certain
amount of risk is a prerequisite to success in any endeavor. An eight-
eenth-century proverb states: "Boldness in business is the first, second,
and third thing."1' 0
E. Other Possible Benefits of Allowing Law Firms to Go Public
Scholars have identified additional possible benefits of allowing law
firms to go public. For partners, considering the prospect of going pub-
lic is in itself a "wonderfully eye-opening strategic planning tool.' 7'
Once public, managing partners would become "far more disciplined
about ... business" because of the need to explain "progress, or lack
168. John McMillan discusses risk attitudes and explains how the stock market allows risk-averse
investors to develop diversified portfolios, so as not to put all their eggs in one basket. See
MCMILLAN, supra note 95, at 37. These diversified holdings lead to an environment in which firms
can take on risks that individual investors and nonpublic firms could not.
169. Id. at 38.
170. Id.
171. Brill, supra note 98, at 3.
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thereof' to .shareholders in the annual report and proxy statement.172
Publicly held law firms would be more "stable" than their privately
held sibling firms because, among other things, the new capital would
ease short-term cash flow needs that otherwise destabilize law firms.
Publicly held law firms could also reward their lawyers more equi-
tably. Firms could award stock to lawyers "at various milestones in their
careers."" Publicly held law firms could offer stock to important non-
lawyer employees as well.'74 Finally, the partner-associate hierarchy
could be eased out by offering associates larger amounts of stock as
their seniority increases. 175
In addition to the myriad benefits of access to the capital markets,
allowing lawyers to join business associations with nonlawyers would
create a host of benefits for law firm clients. The most obvious benefits
are client convenience and non-duplication of expenses. Customers of a
tax firm comprised of lawyers and accountants could have their taxes
filed by a firm that would also stand ready to represent them in case
they had to go to tax court. Customers of a real estate firm made up of
lawyers, real estate agents, and lenders could look for property, have the
purchase documents drawn up, and seek financing all in one office.
This "one-stop shopping" would save time for both the client (who
does not need to seek out separate professionals for each necessary task)
and for the professionals (who do not need to spend time coordinating
and discussing the project with outsiders to the firm). Clients would save
money as the professionals save time-the professionals' time is the cli-
ent's money. Firms made up of lawyers and laypersons would also
benefit from non-duplication of expenses. A tax boutique firm could
join with a tax accounting firm, cutting down the overhead for both
firms. This too would result in increased savings for clients.
Law firms, as well as their investors and clients, would benefit sub-
stantially from allowing nonlawyer investment in law firms. As the
capital requirements of law firms have increased, the pressure on inter-
nally generated capital has become greater. Law firms need access to the
public equity markets now more than ever to fund growth and invest-
ment in new technologies and personnel. Allowing law firms to go pub-
lic would both increase the capital available for investment in providing
legal services and better meet society's needs for such services. In the
face of a changing legal landscape, it is difficult to understand why the
172. Id.
173. Id. at 102 ("The stock [lawyers] get initially with the public offering, or accumulate later on
through ... options, would be salable only in limited percentages at various age or seniority
milestones, and perhaps only on the condition that the lawyer not move to a competing firm.").
174. See id.
175. See id
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traditional view-that no law firm should be allowed to go public-
continues to hold sway.
V
A POTENTIAL AGENCY COST PROBLEM
Over sixty years ago, in a preeminent work, Professors Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means suggested that "the usual stockholder has little
power over the affairs of the [corporate] enterprise" because of the
separation of ownership and control present in the corporate form.
176
They asserted that shareholders generally were passive owners of the
corporation who had little ability to direct managers' activities in the
corporations in which they invested." In contrast, corporate managers,
typically with little ownership interest, controlled the entity's opera-
tions.' Because managers had little invested in the firm, their primary
goal was often not to maximize shareholder wealth, but rather their own
utility. 79
Furthermore, Berle and Means suggested that the ability of share-
holders to elect directors, and thereby control management, was rela-
tively meaningless in the context of large corporations, since
management controlled the proxy machinery and hence the outcome of
the election. 80 Management, in short, had become a "self-perpetuating
oligarchy." 8'
Modem economic theorists view the problems created by a separa-
tion of ownership and control differently from Berle and Means. These
theorists see the corporation as the central party to contractual arrange-
ments between managers and owners by which factors of production are
combined.' 2 As Professors Michael Jensen and Eugene Fama contend,
this interrelationship between managers and owners involves an agency
relationship in which the owners (shareholders) serve as principals, re-
ceiving the benefits of the firm's profitability and growth, and man-
agement as their agents, receiving a specified payoff.83 In essence,
176. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, Tim MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 89 (1932); see also John H. Matheson and Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and
the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1330-33 (1992)
(discussing the history of corporate governance principles and providing a model framework to solve
the problem of separation of ownership and control).
177. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 176, at 84-90.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 121-24.
180. See id. at 86-88.
181. Matheson and Olson, supra note 176, at 1330; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 176, at
87.
182. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FrN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
183. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 301, 302-03 (1983).
1998]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
owners bear the risks associated with the enterprise, while managers run
the corporation as specialized decision-makers for the benefit of the
owners.
The primary benefit of this corporate form is readily apparent.
Skilled managers, who might lack capital, are able to run the corpora-
tion, and shareholders, who might lack managerial skills, may invest in
the firm and realize a return on their investment.'8 This specialization of
functions also allows investors to diversify their portfolios, thus reducing
risk and making investment more attractive.8
This agency relationship, however, is not without cost. Foremost,
the agency relationship exposes owners to the risk that they will need to
incur expenditures to monitor or control the activities of management
so that managers will not use funds for their own benefit. These expen-
ditures, known as agency costs, are the costs to the principal of obtain-
ing faithful and effective performance from its agent. 16 From this
perspective, the dilemma of the separation of ownership and control is
not viewed in terms of shareholders' absence of control, as advocated
by Berle and Means, but rather as a question of how to reduce agency
costs incurred by owners in monitoring their agents in order to prevent
fiduciary abuse.
Although allowing law firms to go public creates a risk-for the
first time-that attorneys would exploit shareholders' wealth for their
own benefit, this risk can be contained using strategies already em-
ployed in related corporate contexts. Corporate law, for example, im-
poses liability on managers for any breach of the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care that management owes to shareholders.' Under the
duty of care standard, a manager must "act in good faith," with the
care a "reasonably prudent person" in a similar position under similar
circumstances would exercise and "in a manner that he [or she]
184. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.
& ECON. 327, 329-30 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims]; Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290-92 (1980); Fama & Jensen, supra
note 183, at 305-09.
185. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L REv. 1, 19 (1986) (stating that portfolio theory divides the risk associated with any
security into two components: a firm-specific component and a systematic or nondiversifiable
component associated with general market conditions); Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note
184, at 329 ("Common stock allows residual risk to be spread across many residual claimants who
individually choose the extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations
offering such claims.").
186. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 183, at 304 (defining agency costs as the "costs of
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests");
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 182, at 309-10.
187. See generally ROBERT CHALES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-141 (1986) (explaining
management's fiduciary duties).
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reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."'88 The
business judgment rule provides that courts should presume managers
have fulfilled the requisite duty of care unless the manager has acted
with gross negligence.18 9
To protect against self-interested decisions on the part of manage-
ment, the duty of loyalty requires managers to make decisions that are
in the best interests of the corporation." In essence, this duty prohibits
management from self-dealing and acting faithlessly to the corpora-
tion.19' To ensure compliance with the duty of loyalty, courts employ a
strict standard of review for management decisions involving a direct
conflict of interest. 92
Beyond fiduciary duties, contractual arrangements may act to con-
strain managerial indiscretion within a legal corporation. Contractual
relationships can reduce agency costs by providing shareholders with
the ability to displace management.93 Contracts may also serve as a
means by which management's interests can be aligned with that of the
firm through such incentives as performance-based compensation or
stock options.' 94
Finally, market forces, including the labor market, 95 the market
for products and services, 196  and the market for corporate
188. Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of
Independence, 67 TEx. L REv. 1351, 1358 (1989); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 945, 948 (1990) (stating that a corporate
director's duty of care consists of four distinct duties: (1) the duty to monitor the corporation's
business; (2) the duty to inquire about information that raises cause for concern; (3) the duty to
exercise care in making decisions; and (4) the duty to make reasonable decisions). See generally
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE Busitss JUDGmENT RULE 28 (3d ed. 1991) (explaining the duty of
care); VILLIAM Fl KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DiRacTORs § 2.01, at 38 (4th ed. 1988) (condemning personal dealing by officer or directors).
189. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1983) (stating that Delaware cases
impose a less exacting standard than simple negligence for director liability).
190. See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 939-40 (1983).
191. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 188, at 73.
192. See Palmiter, supra note 188, at 1365.
193. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1991) (stating that the certificate of incorporation
may provide shareholders and creditors with the power to vote on displacing management).
194. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 182, at 323-38; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Cm. L REv.
187, 196-97 (1991).
195. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
LU. 698, 701 (1982) (stating that management is constrained by salary, bonuses and reputation);
Fama, supra note 184, at 288-92 (suggesting that managers desire positive evaluation of ability and,
because of such evaluation's effects on current employment and on marketability for alternate and
future employment, managers are restrained from acting inconsistently with the interests of corporate
owners).
196. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 195, at 701 (stating that fierce product competition
demands a diligently and efficiently managed firm).
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control, 97 also may constrain managerial abuses within a legal corpora-
tion. As proponents of the market-monitoring theory posit, corporations
offering shareholders the highest returns will garner the largest invest-
ments and, hence, prosper relative to other entities.198
CONCLUSION
The seventy-year-old prohibitions against nonlawyer investment in
law firms and associations with nonlawyers have created an inefficient
legal services market. Firms cannot access capital markets, limiting their
opportunities for expansion, curtailing investments in technology and
training, and hindering competition.
In response to the inefficiencies these restrictions have created, the
prohibition on nonlawyer investment in law firms must be lifted. Each
of the traditional arguments against allowing such investment-fear of
corporate giants, interference with professional independence and
judgment, breaching of client confidences, unauthorized practice of law,
and the danger of the legal profession becoming too businesslike-have
proved to be phantom concerns. These concerns are far outweighed by
the substantial benefits of allowing law firms to incorporate, to engage
in business associations with nonlawyers, and to receive investments by
nonlawyers. These benefits include capital for expansion, capital for
investment in new technologies and new lawyers, financing for contin-
gency fee cases, and a myriad of other rewards. Most persuasively, per-
haps, as the practice of law continues to be increasingly transformed
from a profession into a business, it makes little sense to prevent lawyers
from using the financial tools that virtually every other business has
available to it.
197. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L REV. 1161, 1169-73 (1981); Michael C. Jensen &
Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983); see also Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (recognizing validity of tender offers as an incentive for
managers). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L REV. 1145, 1153-54
(1984) (rejecting the notion that a market for corporate control monitors manager accountability to
the corporation).
198. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L REv.
1416, 1419-21 (1989).
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